The Brain in the Vat Argument
(1) ~JE(~BIV) (2) JE(Hands) ® JE(~BIV) Therefore:
(3) ~JE(Hands)
The argument's second premise may be viewed as an abbreviated instance of the principle that JE is closed under known entailment. 6 The thought is that, since one's having hands obviously entails one's not being a (handless) BIV, one cannot have JE for Hands without also having JE for ~BIV. The argument's first premise expresses the skeptic's trump card:
one fails to have JE for ~BIV. Further below, I will discuss the reasoning in defense of this premise. For now, the point I'd like to make is that envatment (one's being a BIV) is just one among many skeptical hypotheses. Others are lying in one's bed dreaming, being deceived by an evil demon, and the world having popped into existence five minutes ago. If JE closure is true, it follows that we have JE for the ordinary things we believe about the external worldquotidian propositions henceforth-only if we also have justification for denying the aforementioned skeptical hypotheses. Wright calls such denials-e.g. that one is not envatted, or that the world is not five minutes old-cornerstone propositions. 7 Cornerstones (for short) can be local and global. 8 Here are two examples of local cornerstones: the red-looking table before me is not white with red lights shining at it, and the animal in the enclosure appearing to be a zebra is not a mule painted to look like a zebra. Denials of the familiar sceptical hypotheses are global cornerstones. 6 With justification closure stated as an explicit premise, the BIV argument goes thus:
(1) ~JE(~BIV) (2) [JE(Hands) & JE(Hands ® ~BIV)] ® JE(~BIV) (3) JE(Hands ® ~BIV) Therefore: (4) ~JE(~Hands) I take justification closure to be a thesis about how a subject's cognitive system is justificationally structured. Thus understood, the principle entails nothing about how, given JE(Hands) & JE(Hands ® ~BIV), one's justification for ~BIV comes about. The alternative reading is to take justification closure to be a principle about how justification is acquired via deduction. (For such an understanding of knowledge closure, see Hawthorne 2004 .) It seems to me that, thus understood, it is not plausible that justification is closed under known entailment. A necessary truth is entailed by any proposition whatever. Surely, I cannot acquire justification for '2+2=4' by virtue of being justified in believing (a) that the number of ants is greater than three, and (b) that that proposition entails '2 + 2 =4'. See also note 24. 7 Dretske (2004) refers to such propositions as being 'heavyweight'. Wittgenstein calls them 'hinge propositions'; see section 11.1 of Wright's contribution in Todd and Zardini. 8 Henceforth, the term 'cornerstone' will refer to global cornerstones unless indicated otherwise.
The distinction between quotidian propositions and cornerstones allows us to see the BIV argument as an instance of a general argument in support of global scepticism about perceptual justification. It goes as follows: JE for quotidian propositions requires having JE for cornerstones. But there is no JE for cornerstones. Therefore, there is no JE for quotidian propositions. There are three principal ways of responding to this argument. They define the initial theoretical options.
Anti-scepticism
We have JE for quotidian propositions, and we have JE for believing that the dreaded sceptical scenarios do not obtain.
JE closure is preserved.
Closure denial
We have JE for quotidian propositions although we never have JE for cornerstones. JE is not closed under known entailment.
Scepticism
We have JE neither for quotidian propositions nor for cornerstones. JE closure holds.
Closure denial is a concessive response, overlapping partially with the other two positions.
Anti-scepticism and scepticism are in agreement about JE closure but otherwise concede nothing to each other.
Dogmatic and Non-Dogmatic Anti-Scepticism
Further theoretical options open up when we consider alternative ways in which the responses of anti-scepticism and closure denial can be pursued. The path of anti-scepticism can be followed in a dogmatic and a non-dogmatic way. According to dogmatic anti- 
Closure Denial and Welfare Epistemology
Next, let us consider the denial of justification closure. The case for it is based on two premises:
In typical cases, we have JE for quotidian propositions.
(ii) JE for cornerstone propositions is not possible.
If (i) and (ii) are true, then we get cases in which we have JE for a particular quotidian proposition and lack JE for the relevant cornerstones. For example, if (i) and (ii) are true, then people with hands will (normally) be in this position: they have JE for believing they have hands, they lack JE for believing they are not envatted, while it is (or at least could be) obvious to them that hand possession entails non-envatment. So (i) and (ii) necessitate the outcome that JE is not closed under known entailment. The problem with this view is that it's committed to abominable conjunctions. 13 Consider: I'm justified in believing that I have hands, but I'm not justified in believing that I'm not a (handless) BIV. It is difficult to see how it could be rational to assert the former while conceding the latter. (ii) It affirms a version of justification closure: Whenever one knows a quotidian proposition p to entail a cornerstone proposition q, then JE for p entails JP for q, without, however, entailing JE for q.
(iii) It is conservative, i.e., opposed to dogmatism: perceptual justification for quotidian propositions cannot be immediate; it requires justification for cornerstone propositions.
(iv) It is non-evidential, i.e., opposed not only to dogmatism but also to nondogmatic evidential anti-scepticism: JE for cornerstone propositions is unavailable.
With features (i) -(iv) in place, the foundation is laid for the welfare aspect of Wright's epistemology:
(v) Perceptual experiences are a source of justification because we have a nonevidential, unearned, default-type of justification for rejecting sceptical scenarios: JP for the cornerstone propositions on which the evidential power of perception rests.
Next, I will focus on feature (iv).
14 See Duncan Prichard's contribution to Todd and Zardini, pp. section 10.1. (2) I have JE for ~H* because a neuroscientist tells me I'm not hallucinating.
Is
Prichard and Wright would reject (2), just as they reject that a neuroscientist can give me JE for ~BIV. Arguably, the rejection of (2) is not a happy outcome. Let us see whether it can be avoided. Compare (2) Therefore, hand experiences are not JE for ~BIV. Likewise, scientific testimony that BIVs don't exist is evidence of BIV non-existence only if one already has JE for ~BIV. However, the scientific testimony that BIVs don't exist already is JE for ~BIV.
Is Evidential Self-Defense Plausible?
Is it plausible to think that there is such a thing as evidential self-defense? According to and let the entailed proposition be q = Winter has always been followed by spring.
Arguably, JE for q is JE for ~p.
27
Another way of supporting the possibility of self-defense is to find plausible instances of it. I myself think it is plausible to say that, when E is a neuroscientist's testimony that I'm not hallucinating, her testimony is evidence for believing that ~(I have the experience of a neuroscientist telling me I'm not hallucinating & H*). And it seems even more plausible to me that, when E is the totality of my reasons for believing that Napoleon is dead, E is evidence for believing that ~(I have reasons to believe that Napoleon is dead & I'm a BIV in Napoleon's envatment lab). 28 And here is a third example. Consider a body of evidence, E*, giving me JE for believing that the table before me is red (Red). E* consists of the visual experience of the table's looking red to me and further evidence that there are no nearby red lights, that I'm not wearing red-colored glasses, and that I haven't taken any drugs causing me to hallucinate red surfaces. I think it is plausible to claim that E* is evidence for ~(E* & ~Red) although (E* & ~Red) entails E*. Whereas Vogel's example provides indirect support for self-defense by directly attacking the entailment principle, these three example support self-defense directly, thereby indirectly providing reasons for rejecting the entailment principle.
A third way of supporting evidential self-defense focuses on the nature of deception.
Successful deception entails providing the deceived subject with evidence against deception.
Suppose someone wants to kill Jones and frame Smith for the murder. This involves, among (2013) raises trouble for dogmatism by deploying the entailment principle, and Pryor (2013) defends dogmatism by rejecting that principle. 27 Todd and Zardini, p. 92. Vogel presents as well additional considerations counting against the entailment principle. 28 The sceptical hypothesis entertained here is that Napoléon Bonaparte is still alive in 2015 and running a secret envatment lab.
other things, planting Smith's fingerprints on the murder weapon. It also involves fabricating a body of evidence that is both JE for believing Smith murdered Jones and JE for believing Smith is not being framed. Likewise, if a criminal scientist wants to envat you in such a way that your being a BIV is completely concealed from you, he must give you evidence for believing (among other things) that you have a body and evidence for believing that envatment is nothing to worry about. In other words, the criminal scientist must give you an evidential system providing you with JE for believing that your evidence for thinking you have a body is not misleading. The point is that a BIV's total evidence necessarily defends itself against the envatment hypothesis.
What position does dogmatism take regarding the plausibility of self-defense?
Dogmatists must accept the possibility of evidential self-defense and reject the entailment principle. 29 For example, let E be my hand experiences. According to dogmatism, E gives me JE for ~BIV, and thus gives me JE for ~(E & ~Hands). There is, however, a gulf between the dogmatic and the non-dogmatic account of how evidential self-defense works.
According to dogmatism, a neuroscientist's testimony that I'm not hallucinating is by itself evidence for ~H*, i.e., for believing that this experience is not misleading. According to the non-dogmatic alternative, her testimony is evidence for believing her testimony is not misleading only if that testimony is embedded in a large body of evidence confirming the testimony's reliability and confirming the reliability of that body of evidence itself. I perceive the scientist telling me I'm not hallucinating. This perceptual experience is a source of JE in part because I have perceptual evidence for considering perception to be reliable. Evidence for considering perception reliable also comes from memory. My memory's testimony is a source of JE because its own testimony confirms that it is reliable. What emerges is a large evidential structure in which perception is used to provide JE for the reliability of perception, and memory is used as a source of JE for the reliability of memory. So according to the conservative version of evidential anti-scepticism, the experience of a neuroscientist telling I'm not hallucinating self-defends against H* by virtue of being integrated into a large body of evidence that certifies its own reliability. (2013) and Pryor (2013) . 30 I have defended a response to scepticism along these lines in Steup (2004 Steup ( ), (2008 Steup ( ), and (2013 rationality at work in the search for truth, is unavoidably conditional upon placing nonevidential, merely practical trust in the cornerstones.
Closure Failure Again
In "On Epistemic Alchemy," 35 Aidan McGlynn focuses on a different problem for welfare epistemology: closure failure. With regard to hand possession and the envatment specter, welfare epistemology allows for the following possibility:
McGlynn argues that, if we accept the possibility of CF1, we incur an unacceptable cost.
Consider the logical rule of addition as a specific instance of entailment:
Replacing p with Hands and q with ~BIV, we get:
This is equivalent to: This mitigates the pain of closure failure to a not insignificant degree.
Welfare, Dogmatism, and Non-Dogmatic Evidential Antiscepticism
I conclude by briefly reviewing the three non-sceptical options besides outright closure denial. Each of them is inflicted with a kind of alchemy. According to welfare epistemology, JE for quotidian propositions cannot come from JE for cornerstones. Rather, it ultimately flows from JP for cornerstones. This view involves the problematic assertion that we can get evidential juice from of a non-evidential fruit. Dogmatism denies that JE for quotidian propositions depends on justification for cornerstones. The view says that hand experiences give you, all by themselves, JE for believing you're not a BIV. Likewise, the view says that the perceptual experiences of appearing to see an oasis gives you, by itself, JE for believing you are not hallucinating an oasis. Particularly the latter claim is baffling. Finally, non-dogmatic evidential anti-scepticism agrees with welfare epistemology that JE for quotidian propositions depends on justification for cornerstones. But, unlike welfare epistemology, that view holds that we actually possess JE for cornerstones. We have JE for them because, when a particular experience says sceptical hypothesis H is false, then, provided that experience is embedded in an evidential system that certifies its own reliability, we have JE for believing that that experience is not misleading, and therefore have JE for ~H. Of course, that an evidential system can legitimately vouch for its own reliability, thereby supplying JE for believing that the system is not misleading, is a highly controversial idea. None of the three views, then, can leave their advocates entirely comfortable.
Purdue University
West Lafayette, IN 47907-2098 steup@purdue.edu
